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Disagreement about logic

Hjortland, Ole Thomassen
Peer reviewed, Journal article
Accepted version
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URI
https://hdl.handle.net/1956/23047
Date
2019
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  • Department of Philosophy [205]
Original version
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2019.1651084
Abstract
What do we disagree about when we disagree about logic? On the face of it, classical and nonclassical logicians disagree about the laws of logic and the nature of logical properties. Yet, sometimes the parties are accused of talking past each other. The worry is that if the parties to the dispute do not mean the same thing with ‘if’, ‘or’, and ‘not’, they fail to have genuine disagreement about the laws in question. After the work of Quine, this objection against genuine disagreement about logic has been called the meaning-variance thesis. We argue that the meaning-variance thesis can be endorsed without blocking genuine disagreement. In fact, even the type of revisionism and nonapriorism championed by Quine turns out to be compatible with meaning-variance.
Description
Under embargo until: 2021-02-08
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Journal
Inquiry (Oslo)
Copyright
Copyright 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

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