dc.contributor.author | Bangu, Sorin | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-02-02T13:49:08Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-02-02T13:49:08Z | |
dc.date.created | 2021-07-05T12:36:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0045-5091 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2976691 | |
dc.description.abstract | The paper articulates a novel strategy against external world skepticism. It shows that a modal assumption of the skeptical argument cannot be justified. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | en_US |
dc.rights | Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.title | The Appearance of Skepticism: Possibility, Conceivability and Infinite Ascent | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | Copyright The Author(s), 2021 | en_US |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | original | |
cristin.qualitycode | 2 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/can.2021.6 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1920291 | |
dc.source.journal | Canadian Journal of Philosophy | en_US |
dc.source.pagenumber | 94-107 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2021, 51 (2), 94-107. | en_US |
dc.source.volume | 51 | en_US |
dc.source.issue | 2 | en_US |