| dc.contributor.author | Fauzi, Prastudy | |
| dc.contributor.author | Hovd, Martha Norberg | |
| dc.contributor.author | Raddum, Håvard | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-04-01T13:15:41Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-04-01T13:15:41Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2022-01-27T17:17:25Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 978-3-030-81292-8 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2989332 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We present an adaptive key recovery attack on the leveled homomorphic encryption scheme suggested by Li, Galbraith and Ma (Provsec 2016), which itself is a modification of the GSW cryptosystem designed to resist key recovery attacks by using a different linear combination of secret keys for each decryption. We were able to efficiently recover the secret key for a realistic choice of parameters using a statistical attack. In particular, this means that the Li, Galbraith and Ma strategy does not prevent adaptive key recovery attacks. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Post-Quantum Cryptography | |
| dc.title | A Practical Adaptive Key Recovery Attack on the LGM (GSW-like) Cryptosystem | en_US |
| dc.type | Chapter | en_US |
| dc.description.version | acceptedVersion | en_US |
| dc.rights.holder | Copyright 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG | en_US |
| cristin.ispublished | true | |
| cristin.fulltext | postprint | |
| cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81293-5_25 | |
| dc.identifier.cristin | 1991702 | |
| dc.source.pagenumber | 483-498 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | In: Cheon, J.H., Tillich, JP. (eds) Post-Quantum Cryptography. PQCrypto 2021 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12841, 483-498.. | en_US |
